基于场景的C2系统的模拟与评价方法

为适应一体化联合作战指挥控制系统快速决策与实时性能评价的要求,提出一种基于场景的系统快速模拟与评价模型.其优点在于①根据系统需求实现系统的建模、仿真代码自动生成及性能评价.②模型自适应能力强,系统场景设计中的冲突、不完整、安全、性能及行为错误等问题都可以通过仿真过程中不同方面的动态分析检测出来.     

对一体化联合作战的思考

对一体化联合作战的概念及基本特征作了介绍,探讨了研究一体化联合作战的迫切性,对我军一体化联合作战的的现状及如何加速提高我军一体化联合作战的能力作了详细的论述。     

基于SEA的舰载C3I系统防空作战效能评估模型

现代海战中,空中目标对舰艇的威胁越来越大,舰艇的防空作战能力已成为衡量其综合作战能力的主要指标。而C3I系统作为舰艇的指挥中枢,其性能直接决定着舰艇防空作战的成败。根据现代海战中空中目标的武器作战使用方式,并针对SEA方法的要求,提出了评估C3I系统在防空作战时系统效能的三个主要性能量度(MOP),通过分析C3I系统在防空作战时的特点,建立了评估C3I系统防空作战效能的SEA方法模型。并利用该模型比较了不同的C3I系统的作战效能,对结果进行了简要分析,证明了SEA方法模型对舰载防空C3I系统进行效能评估的可行性。     

基于可拓工程方法的舰空导弹作战通道性能分析

分析了舰空导弹作战通道性能的影响因素,应用可拓工程方法建立了舰空导弹作战通道性能多指标参数的物元可拓评估模型,以定量的结果对舰空导弹作战通道性能进行了评估分级,并与层次分析法的结果进行了比较,结论基本一致。为舰空导弹作战通道性能评估问题寻求出一种新方法,其评估结果可为决策提供定量依据。     

应急作战装备物资供应链研究

把供应链管理理论应用到应急作战装备物资供应中,抛弃传统的管理模式,从应急作战装备物资供应链的内涵、应急作战装备物资供应链管理内容、应急作战装备物资供应链管理方法和应急作战装备物资供应链实施策略4个方面进行阐述,旨在提高应急作战条件下装备物资供应保障效率。     

网络中心战概念及其体系结构模型

介绍了美、英、澳等军事大国在网络中心战领域的研究状况,阐释了制信息权的概念,给出了网络中心战的定义.分析了美军在<2020年联合构想>中确认的核心作战概念,详细阐述了网络中心作战的顶层概念框架及顶层概念到第二层的映射关系.介绍了网格技术,提出了网络中心战网格模型的立体结构和平面结构,最后总结了对这一领域研究的重要意义.     

面向联合作战行动设计的态势差分析机理研究

文章介绍了态势差的概念内涵,分析了在设计联合作战行动时为什么要分析态势差,阐述了如何分析态势差。态势差分析是工程化作战筹划的一个环节,研究态势差分析机理,能为作战行动设计提供有力支撑,提高作战筹划效率。     

解读《2017美国海军陆战队航空建设计划》

海军陆战队是美军在海外执行任务的主要作战力量,其发展建设的重点将决定未来美军的海外战略重心。本文以《2017年美国海军陆战队航空兵建设计划》的主要内容为研究对象,概述了未来美国海军陆战队作战的总体构想,对美国海军陆战队主要更新换代的海空装备进行了研究分析,总结了美军海军陆战队航空建设的启示。以分析结果为依据,对未来美军的战略重心进行了判断。     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.     

Cost allocation rules for elastic single‐attribute situations

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017